The New Zealand government introduced a Primary Health Care Strategy (PHCS) in 2001 aimed at improving access to primary health care, improving health, and reducing inequalities in health. The Strategy represented a substantive increase in health funding by government and a move from a targeted to a universal funding model. This paper uses representative national survey data to examine the distribution of fees paid for primary health care by different individuals under the mixed public-private financing model in place prior to the introduction of PHCS. Using multivariate regression analysis, we find that fees do vary, with people who might be expected to have greater needs paying less. However, apart from people with diabetes, there is no direct link between self-reported health status and fees paid. The findings indicate that a mixed public-private financing model can result in a fee structure which recognises differences across different population groups. The findings also provide a baseline against which changes in funding brought about by the PHCS can be evaluated.
Introduction
The impact of patient co-payments on access to care, utilisation of services and health outcomes, and the implications for public policy of patient co-payments, have been the focus of much attention in the international health policy literature over many years (Scitovsky and Sneider, 1972; Rice and Morrison, 1994; Sepehri and Chernomas, 2001 ). The issue is of particular salience in New Zealand, where primary health care traditionally has been only partially subsidised by government, resulting in individual New Zealanders cofunding their access to primary health care through significant out-of-pocket payments, with the level of co-payments traditionally set by general practitioners (GPs), in an unregulated market setting.
Concerns have long been expressed that these arrangements have resulted in significant barriers to access to primary health care for many New Zealanders, particularly amongst Māori, Pacific, low income and high needs populations (Crengle, 1999; Cumming and Mays, 1999; Ministry of Health, 1999; Tukiotonga, 1999; Raymont, 2004) . Such barriers to access are likely to have resulted in poorer health status and higher than appropriate use of secondary care services for those affected. As a result, the New Zealand government introduced in 2001 a Primary Health Care Strategy (PHCS) aimed at improving access to primary health care, improving health, and reducing inequalities in health. The PHCS represents a move from targeted to universal funding of primary health care.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the distribution of fees paid for primary health care by different individuals prior to the introduction of PHCS. It uses data from two national health surveys -the 1996/97 and 2002/03 New Zealand Health Surveys -to explore the levels of fees paid by patients using primary health care services in these two years, to analyse the determinants of differing fee levels across a range of economic, sociodemographic and health characteristics, and to consider the financial implications arising from the use of a mixed public-private financing model. This model allows us to examine the extent that New Zealanders with different health needs are paying different prices in the unregulated markets for GP services.
We begin by describing the current institutional environment in New Zealand and how it changed with the introduction of the PHCS. We then compare the financing model used in New Zealand to those used in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom and Australia and discuss previous research on primary health care fees in these countries.
We next describe the data used in this study and discuss the difference in fees paid by different individuals in each of the two years, using bivariate analysis. In order to assess these differences more thoroughly, we then derive a multivariate model for variation in fees paid and use the data to estimate the relationship between various socio-economic and health characteristics and the GP fees paid by individuals. The results are then presented and discussed.
Background
The New Zealand government originally introduced policies to finance primary health care for the population in the mid-1930s. Initially, it was hoped to introduce free primary health care for all New Zealanders, with providers to be funded on a capitation basis. However, protracted negotiations with the British Medical Association (which represented New Zealand GPs at that time) resulted instead in the introduction of government fee-for-service partial subsidies for GP care, with GPs retaining the right to charge patients fees directly (except for maternity care). The government paid GPs directly on a claims basis, and the subsidies originally covered about 66 percent of the total fee charged by GPs for their services (Government White Paper, 1974) .
By the 1970s, however, the government subsidy represented only around 33 percent of the fees GPs charged, and concerns were being raised about the impact of these charges on New Zealanders' access to services, particularly for those with poorer health, for those who use services regularly and for those on lower incomes (Government White Paper, 1974). In the early 1990s, the funding arrangements were altered, with government subsidies increased but targeted through the use of entitlement cards. The Community Services Card (CSC) was made available for household on a low income and the High Use Health Card (HUHC) was made available for those regularly using primary health care services. Both cards represented entitlement to subsidies. About 50 percent of the population were entitled to the CSC (Gribben, 1996) and an estimated five percent were eligible for the HUHC. Takeup for both these cards, however, was thought to be lower than expected (Foley, unpublished) .
In 1997, universal subsidies were introduced for children, with the aim of free care provision for those aged less than six years of age, although in practice some fees continued to be charged by some practices. At this stage, adult New Zealanders without a CSC or HUHC were not receiving any government subsidies towards the cost of their primary health care (Davis et al, 1994) . In 2001, the New Zealand government introduced a Primary Health Care Strategy (PHCS) aimed at improving access to primary health care, improving health and reducing inequalities in health.
Implementation has proceeded extremely quickly, with Primary Health
Organisations (PHOs) developed to put the new policies into practice. By September 2008, some four million New Zealanders were enrolled with 80 PHOs. Part of the PHCS involves moving from a targeted to a universal financing model, so that all New Zealanders are now eligible for subsidised primary health care services. The government has committed more than $2.2 billion over seven years from 2002/03 for implementation of the Strategy (Hodgson, 2006) . New funding was provided first to Access PHOs, with high need populations, to reduce user charges for all their enrolees. New funding for Interim PHOs (with a lower proportion of enrolees with higher needs) was rolled out by age group over the past few years, again with much of the new funding aimed at reducing the fees that New
Zealanders pay when they use services. Additional funding has also been provided to offer further financial support to PHOs committed to ensuring very low cost access by maintaining low fees (Hodgson, 2007 
International Comparisons
The financing of primary health care differs greatly between countries. In this section, we review the financing models used in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Australia and discuss previous research on GP fees in each of these countries. 1 Compared to these countries, the institutional situation in New Zealand is unique in the sense that a universal health care system is in place (and secondary services are free), but the market for GP services is essentially unregulated in the price domain. Thus, it is an ideal country in which to examine the characteristics correlated with GP fees, as individuals have complete freedom to choose different providers but providers are constrained by the fact that individuals can use secondary facilities as an alternative provider of services.
United States
There are two main public insurance programmes in the United States which, in total, cover 27 percent of the population. These are Medicare, which provides insurance cover for the elderly population and some of those with disabilities, and Medicaid, which provides cover for a segment of the poor population. Approximately 59 percent of the population have private health insurance. The extent to which this coverage includes different health services depends on the specifics of each insurance policy. Private insurance makes up 37 percent of total expenditures on health, while public insurance makes up 45 percent of total health expenditure. User-charges make up 13 percent of health expenditure.
Hospitals and physicians are paid in a variety of ways, including through charges, capitation and discounted fees.
Steinwald and Stone (1974) is one of the only papers that has investigated determinants of GP fees. The authors used data reported by GPs to estimate the importance of physician characteristics, practice characteristics, patient characteristics and insurance types on the prices charged by GPs. They found that patient characteristics and insurance type were more important in explaining variations in fees between GPs than the GP or practice characteristics. Fees had a weak but significant positive association with patient income. The income effect was twice as strong for the more highly skilled internists as for GPs. They also found a positive relationship between the number of physicians in other fields relative to the population and a negative relationship between the numbers of physicians in the same field relative to the population.
Other research on this topic in the United States has focused on modelling the market for GP services, particularly with regard to determining whether the market is perfectly competitive or monopolistic (Newhouse, 1970) , determining whether physician induced demand maintains GP income levels when fees are fixed (Hadley and Reschovsky, 2006) , and attempting to explain the faster rate of growth in health expenditure in the United
States relative to other countries (Anderson et al. 2005) . Research has also raised concerns regarding the health and wellbeing of the 14 percent of the population that is not covered by any type of insurance (Ayanian et al, 2000) .
Canada
Canada has a universal, comprehensive, public health insurance scheme. All "medically necessary" care is provided by hospitals and physicians and is fully funded by the provinces and the Federal Government (Barer et al 1988) . Patients face no user charges for these services. Private insurance is available for services not covered by the public insurance system, such as dental care, rehabilitation and prescription drugs.
Public funding comprises about 70 percent of total health expenditure, with private insurance making up 12 percent and user charges (for those services not covered by the federal/provincial plans) 15 percent. Physicians are mainly paid on a fee-for-service basis, with the fees negotiated annually between the provincial medical association and provincial ministries. If physicians wish to charge patients fees for services covered by the federal/provincial plans, they cannot be included in the public system. Hospitals are mainly funded on a budgetary basis.
Research has shown that the comprehensive, universal insurance system has reduced barriers to access for those with low socio-economic status (Beck, 1978; Eyles et al, 1995) . Concerns, however, are still expressed that there are other barriers to health care.
While Dunlop et al (2000) found that income was not significantly associated with GP visits, education was significant, and income was significantly associated with visits to specialists.
As a referral is required from a GP for a specialist visit this has health implications for those on low-incomes.
United Kingdom
The United Kingdom (UK) has a fairly comprehensive, universal public health insurance system with the health care provided by the National Health Service. The public insurance covers "medically necessary" health care as well as dental care, rehabilitation and some prescription drugs. 
Australia
Australia has a universal public health insurance scheme (Medicare Higher income patients are more likely to see a specialist rather than a GP and are more likely to be a private patient in a hospital than a public patient. This will be examined more closely later in this section. New Zealanders, while visits that cost over $30 were most common for 25-64 year-olds. 5 Individuals are asked to fill in the arrangement when responding, 'other arrangements'. This has been coded in our data for the 1996/97 survey. The most common responses are 'paid by ACC', 'paid by insurance' or 'paid by my employer'. We include these individuals in the 'free' category in all tables. Less than one percent of respondents in each survey report 'other arrangements'. 6 All individuals are placed into one of the following groups according to their age at the interview: 15-24, 25-44, 45-64, 65-79 and 80+. These groups correspond to the groups used to determine agespecific health policies by the central government, except we group 15-17 year-olds with 18-24 yearolds because of the sample size and separate 80+ year-olds from 65-79 year-olds because of their different health needs. 7 The general price level, as measured by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) increased 11 percent between the second quarter of 1996 and the second quarter of 2002. are more likely to visit the GP than men for all age-groups except the oldest. Overall 85 percent of women had seen a GP in the last year compared to 75 percent of men. These differences are larger in the younger age-groups. Eighty-six percent of 15-24 year-old women had visited a GP in the last year compared with 68 percent of 15-24 year-old men, while 94 percent of 65-79 year-old women visited a GP compared to 92 percent of 65-79 year old men. On the other hand, the distribution of fees paid is quite similar for both men and women in each age-group. These values are then converted to real 2003 dollars using the CPI for the appropriate year.
Data
As hinted at in the previous tables, average real fees varied a good deal across demographic groups, except by gender. For example, individuals aged 15-24 paid the lowest fees, on average $9-$10 less than 45-64 year-olds who paid the highest fees, followed by 80+ year-olds ($6-$7 less), 65-79 year-olds ($5 less), and 25-44 year-olds ($2-$3 less). Differences are also found across ethnic groups, with, on average, Māori paying $5-$7 less and Pacific Islanders $8-$11 less in GP fees than Pākehā/Europeans, and Asians paying similar fees as Pākehā/Europeans. There were also large variations in the fees paid across communities, with individuals in the most deprived communities paying, on average, $10-$12 less in GP fees than individuals in the least deprived communities. 
Regression Analysis
We next use regression analysis to examine the factors that are associated with paying different fees for GP visits in a multivariate framework. This allows us to determine which characteristics have the strongest association with GP fees and to establish whether there is a statistically significant relationship between each characteristic and the level of GP fees paid. The fee paid by an individual for a GP visit reflects both the underlying cost of those services and the quality of services purchased. Thus, while the fee is partially determined by the local supply of and demand for GPs, as well as local and central government price setting policies, ultimately it is a choice variable of the individual.
As a result, if the regression analysis shows that a particular characteristic is associated with paying higher GP fees (for example, gender), we cannot determine whether this occurs because women seek out higher cost GP services (e.g. higher quality services), there is a limited supply of local doctors specialising in GP services targeted towards women, women are charged higher prices because they have a greater demand for GP services, or because government policy is influencing fees along this dimension.
11
Each regression model we estimate takes the form:
where i indexes individuals, t indexes time, Fee it is the real fee paid by individual i for their last GP visit in year t, X it is a vector of individual i's characteristics, Z it is a vector of characteristics for individual i's household, C it is a vector of characteristics for individual i's community, α is the overall model intercept, α t is an indicator variable for the survey year of each record, which controls for aggregate changes in GP fees over time, and ε it is a normal white noise error-term. We estimate these models using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) after converting the fee paid for each individual's last GP visit to a continuous variable by assigning the approximate mid-point of each bracketed fee range to each observation.
12
We estimate regression model (1) using data from all respondents who visited a GP in the last 12 months and reported the cost of their last GP visit. We ignore any sample selection issues and assume that the fees paid by these individuals (80 percent of the sample)
are representative of the fees that would have been paid by those who did not visit a GP in the last year (if they had done so). That is, we assume that the fees paid by individuals depend on their observed characteristics and not on unobserved characteristics that are correlated with the likelihood of an individual visiting the GP.
13
We estimate five specifications of regression model (1) on the pooled data from both surveys. The first specification, which we refer to as the 'baseline' model, only controls for individual demographics, community characteristics, and the survey year. 14 The second specification adds control variables for household composition to the first specification.
15
The third specification adds control variables for real household income to the second specification. 16 The fourth specification adds control variables for employment status and different age, ethnic and socioeconomic groups and the impact of these policies are likely reflected in our regression findings. 12 We also estimated our regression models using Maximum Likelihood Interval Regression, which is a technique designed for models where the dependent variable is reported in brackets. Our results were qualitatively similar and thus we present results from the more commonly used OLS approach. 13 For example, if individuals who did not visit the GP are all predisposed to choosing GPs with low fees this could bias our estimates. Intuition suggests that this type of selection is unlikely to be a serious concern. 14 Specifically, we include an indicator variable for whether the respondent is female; four indicator variables for their age-group, with being aged 25-44 the omitted default group; three indicator variables for the prioritised ethnic groups, with being Pākehā/European or Other the omitted default group; three indicator variables for an individual's highest qualification, with the omitted default group being having no qualifications; an indicator variable for whether the individual reports currently being legally married or living in a de-facto marriage; an indicator variable for whether the community is rural; and a series of indicator variables for each NZDep decile, with decile 1 (e.g. the least deprived communities) the omitted default group. 15 Specifically, we include two indicator variables for whether the household is a 'single parent household' or a 'couple with children household' versus the default omitted group of 'households with no children'. We also control for the number of people living in the household (top-coded at 8). 16 Approximately 20 percent of households do not report their income in both survey rounds. Given their numbers, we do not exclude these households and instead include an indicator variable for whether the household has not reported their income.
occupation to the third specification. 17 Finally, the fifth specification adds controls for access to health insurance, self-reported health status, chronic health conditions and health behaviours.
18
We take this approach of estimating increasingly comprehensive specifications for two reasons. First, it allows us to examine whether particular variables explain some of the variation we see in the simple descriptive tables. For example, we are able to identify the particular variables that explain much of the variation observed in fees paid by different agegroups. Second, one important concern is that some of our explanatory variables may be endogenously determined with GP fees. This is particularly relevant for the health variables included in the final specification. For example, the likelihood of reporting health problems will depend on how frequently an individual sees a GP which is directly related to the fees charged for those services. Another example is that the decision to get individual health insurance is quite likely closely related to the fees charged by GPs. Economic variables such as employment can also be endogenously determined if, for example, lower available GP fees encourage people to go to the doctor more frequently and these time costs lead them to reduce their employment intensity. We can alleviate these concerns by examining whether the coefficients on socio-demographic characteristics change when we add subsequent variables to the model. If they do not change, then it is unlikely that endogeneity bias is a serious concern. Table 6 presents the results from estimating the five specifications of regression model (1). In the baseline specification, we find that, controlling for demographics, younger average than other ethnic groups. People with higher qualifications pay more for GP visits 17 We include two indicator variables for whether an individual is employed full-time or employed part-time, with the default omitted group being individuals who are not employed; and eight indicator variables for the individual's occupation, with the default omitted group being individuals who are legislators or managers. 18 We include an indicator variable for whether an individual report being covered by a health or medical insurance scheme; four indicator variables for an individual reports their health status as being 'very good', 'good', 'fair' or 'poor', with the default omitted group those who report it being 'excellent'; three indicator variables for whether an individual reports ever having been told by a doctor that they have asthma, diabetes, or high blood pressure; an indicator variable for whether an individual is currently a regular smoker; and an indicator variable for whether an individual had a drink containing alcohol in the last 12 months. scores. 19 Household income itself is positively related to GP fees, but this is a weak relationship, with a $10,000 increase in household income associated with a $0.70 increase in fees. However, households that do not report their income pay, on average, $3.40 more for a GP visit, leading one to suspect that these are wealthier households. Thus, these results indicate that some of the relationship between qualifications, community characteristics and GP fees occurs because individuals in higher income households both pay more for GP visits, are more likely to have higher qualifications and are more likely to live in less deprived communities. However, differences in household income explain only about a third of the variation in fees for these characteristics.
Results
Examining the fourth specification, we find that adding controls for employment status has a large impact on a number of results. First, women are now found to spend $1.10 more on average than men for GP visits. Second, much of the age gradient in fees 19 The difference in fees paid for married individuals in also reduced to $1.10 from $2.10 in the baseline specification and Asians are now found to spend more than Pākehā/Europeans on fees. Turning to the final specification, adding the health variables to the model has a limited impact on all the other coefficients. 20 This suggests that endogeneity bias caused by the inclusion of these variables is not a serious concern. Individuals with health insurance pay, on average, $3.20 more per GP visit than other individuals; perhaps indicating that these individuals choose higher priced care, or are charged a higher price, because the cost is shared with an insurance agency. There is no independent relationship between self-reported health status and the cost of a GP visit. Among individuals with chronic health conditions, only individuals with diabetes pay significantly different GP fees (they pay $1.80 less, on average). Interestingly, regular smokers pay less for GP visits ($0.75 less on average) whereas those who have had an alcoholic drink in the last 12 months pay more ($1.60 more on average). 20 The larger effect is on the NZDep-fees gradient, which becomes slightly less pronounced but is still large with individuals in decile 10 communities paying, on average, $6.30 more per GP visit than individuals in decile 1 communities. 21 We estimate separate models for each age-group and survey year, except because of small sample sizes we pool the 65-79 year-old and 80+ age-groups.
found above are particular to certain age-groups and whether they have changed over time.
Although households, and those in more deprived socio-economic areas. We also find lower fees on average for those who do not have health insurance, which may in part reflect higher prices paid for or charged for those with insurance. These results suggest that the mixed publicprivate financing model does allow for variations in the fees that people pay, and -after controlling for a range of factors -is in line with our expectation that those with lower incomes and those with higher health needs will pay less. As was stated earlier in this paper, the fees paid for a GP visit reflect both the underlying cost of those services and the quality of services purchased and it is not possible with this dataset to determine the mechanism through which lower fees are achieved.
Prior to the PHCS, most adult New Zealanders were paying the full cost of GP care themselves. Those eligible for a subsidy were people on low incomes and people who visited the doctor frequently. These people could access the subsidy by applying for a card to present to their GP. Concerns have been expressed that the cost of GPs in New Zealand resulted in significant barriers to access for many New Zealanders. In a study of five countries in 2004, 28 percent of New Zealanders reported that they had previously forgone medical care because of the cost of a GP visit. This was comparable to the figures for the United States but much higher than that for Canada, the United Kingdom and Australia (Schoen et al, 2004 ). This figure is much higher than the six percent of respondents in the 2002/03 survey who reported that they did not go to the doctor when needed to because of cost. The New Zealand Health Survey had a sample size over ten times that of the New Zealand component of the Commonwealth International Health Policy Survey and was implemented through face-to-face interviews rather than by telephone. These differences in survey design may explain the difference in the magnitude of this figure.
In unreported results, we found that those who reported that they did not see a GP when needing to because of the cost, were those who we would expect to have greater difficulty paying -households with lower incomes, people without health insurance, people in poor health status, and those who live in urban areas. In addition, females, people aged under 44, Māori, and Pacific populations were more likely to report that they did not see a GP because of the cost. Although subsidies were targeted to those whose healthcare was most likely to be adversely affected by co-payments there are several possible explanations as to why these measures may not have been sufficient. Firstly, as we have shown in this paper, GP fees were rising by more than the rate of inflation (between 1996/97 and 2002/03, real fees rose by $5.70-$6), while the government subsidy remained the same (although income thresholds for eligibility to subsidies were inflation-adjusted). Second, there was not a full take-up of these subsidy cards. In 1996, about 80 percent of those eligible had a Community Services Card (CSC) and possibly as few as 20 percent of those eligible had a High Use Health Card (HUHC) (Foley, unpublished) . Third, it is possible that even after the subsidy, GP fees were still high enough to present a barrier to access.
Given that subsidies were available for those on low incomes and those with high health needs, we would have expected to see these lower fees reflected in our results. This The PHCS aims to resolve some of these issues by providing a more universal health subsidy for GP visits. As it is difficult to effectively target low income and high health need patients, universal subsidies can improve services for these individuals. As a result of these changes we would expect to see less fee variation in general, although it is likely that differences will remain, particularly in locations where GP costs are higher (eg. central city location, flexible opening hours, higher quality service). There are concerns, however, that although GP fees will be lower, the co-payments may still be high enough to remain a barrier to access for some individuals (Hefford et al, 2005) . Furthermore it is important to recognise that fees are not the only barrier of access to GP services. primary health care services is fairly inelastic, an issue we will return to in future analyses. 
Conclusion

